Showing posts with label central bank. Show all posts
Showing posts with label central bank. Show all posts

Jun 30, 2009

Central Bank Risk Management

Facing 2009, leads us back 300 years in history, when funding 'credit demand' was one of the main reasons for founding Central Banks in England (1694), the USA (1790) and the Netherlands (1814).

Let's go back in history and have a short look at the situation in the Netherlands 200 years ago...

More history DNB
English, Dutch

Monetary Stability

Nowadays the importance of monetary stability is just as important as a few eras ago. It cannot be underestimated.

The years of the gold standard are behind us. Question is: are there any stable new alternatives?

Learning from the past, one way or the other, we will have to introduce new trustful standards. Maintaining the current situation will probably not lead to a sustainable financial system on the long term.

To stress the importance of a stable standard, just take a look at the development of the next Federal Reserve Balance Sheet:

The above graph clearly shows that Central Bank Risk Management is not an unimportant issue....

Fed Example
Example: As more 'bad loans' and up on the U.S. federal balance sheet, to prohibit downgrade U.S. credit rating , the FED - one way or the other - will have to standardize itself.

Central Banks are monitoring themselves
The past has shown that self-regulation in private financial markets doesn't work. Be confident, it won't work on a Central Bank level either: balance size figures and federal stakeholder interests have grown to enormous proportions.

Central Banks are in fact regulating and monitoring themselves and - except for the Eurosystem - they don't fully comply to international accounting standards as well, a risk society clearly cannot permit itself.

Split up Central Banks
To regain control of central banks, governments will have to split their Central Banks into:
  • A regular "Reserve Bank" (monetary function) and a
  • An objective independent Regulator, that regulates private banks as well as the State Bank.

If a Central Bank is also operating as a State Bank, this Bank should also be separated from the Reserve Bank business, to guaranty an objective monetary policy by the Reserve Bank in a specific country.

In the mean time, Central Banks will have to become innovative and come up with a collectively supported new standard alternative. They have to act fast, before the market creates his own new wild and probably risky standards out the financial market chaos.

Actuaries and Economists could work together to develop such a stable risk-free standard.

Nov 15, 2008

Whistleblower Risk Management

We all know Risk Management is key in our business.

Yet, almost all risk models (e.g. Coso) emphasize mainly on known or knowable risks.

Of course, as we could have seen in the 2008 credit crisis, the art of Risk management is in managing the unknown or unknowable risks.

But how?

Let's try to learn from two main major accidents:

I. The Challenger shuttle disaster (1986)
The accident was caused by failing O-Rings. Warnings of many engineers were overruled and ignored. This crash was the consequence of a typical effect called GROUPTHINK. Groups naturally look for consensus and will often come up with a false consensus, even when individual members disagree.
Watch a video of the space shuttle Challenger disaster that illustrates this GROUPTHINK phenomenon.

Other examples are the Columbia shuttle disaster and the 9/11 attacks. In all cases Management failed because the information suggesting a disaster was weakly transmitted within an bureaucratic system, and managers failed to authorize action because of bad communication and performance or time pressure.

II. The 2008 credit crisis
  • Underestimating early signals
    The first indication of the coming credit crisis was the collapse of Enron in 2003, uncovered by whistleblower Sherron Watkins.

    After the collapse, the FED refused to come out with new 'rules based' guidelines . A Senate investigation showed that - starting already in 2000 - some major U.S. financial institutions had "deliberately misused structured finance techniques". But the Fed and the SEC underestimated the situation, kept to their 'principles based' system and consequently missed the opportunity to to flex their muscle by regulating market conditions for subprime mortgages.

    Lesson: It's not about 'rules OR principles', Football Or Soccer, but it's about 'Rules AND Principles'.

  • Mixed Central Banks (FED) responsibilities
    Central Banks, The Fed in particular, have at the same time two main responsibilities with regard to (other) financial institutions:
    1. Supervision
    2. Providing financial (banking) services

    Those two functions clearly conflict with each other. It's impossible to independently supervise the financial company you're financing at the same time. Supervisory advises will be suspicious by definition.

    Secondly you can't supervise yourself as central bank. Therefore, every country needs an independent (that is 'without central bank board members'), professional supervisory board, that audits and supervises the central bank and the national bailout plan(s).

  • Whistleblowers
    How could the credit crisis technically happen?
    Not an official, but a more outside kind of whistleblower, businessman Warren Buffet, warns in a 2003 BBC article that “Derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction and contracts devised by madmen". The financial world isn't listening.

    Derivatives like Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO's,) were developed to (re)fund the subprime loans. CDO's are packaged portfolios of credit risk, made up from different sliced and diced loans and bonds. They were hard to uncover without a whistleblower. At last an anonymous banker e-mails journalist Gillian Tett of the Financial Times about the situation. Only after she publices early 2007 what's wrong, the dices start rolling. This case also stresses the important role of journalism and whistleblowers in our aim for a healthy transparent financial market.

  • The Greed Game
    One can argue about the roots of the credit crisis. However, essential in the 2008 credit crisis were, or still are, the excessive remuneration practices at private equity companies, hedge funds and banks. They encouraged unhealthy and excessive risk-taking. Key is the lack of balance between possible earnings and possible losses of board members.

    To prevent unhealthy pressure management (with groupthink effects), board members' total rewards should always be in line with the long term realized added value of the company and not be based on yearly P&L profits or short term added value.

Manage the unknown risks
Risk Management is not a static, but a dynamic process.

To gain and behold control of the unknown risks, it's necessary to create a transparent organization and company-process that guarantees whistleblowers' and whisperers' (= whistleblowers, that wish to stay anonymous) safety and encourages and even rewards compliance reports from employees, clients or any other stakeholders.

Because of GROUPTHINK and - on the other hand - possible negative employee outcomes (demotion, dismissal, etc) in case a reported compliance issue turns out to be compliant after all, it's important that whistleblowers are always given the opportunity to report directly, anonymously and safely to the independent federal Supervisor. Employees must have the choice to report internal within their company (small compliance matters) or to report directly to the federal Supervisory board.

  • Separate the Supervisory and Financial Services functions of the central banks (FED)

  • Redesign whistleblowers management
    Whistleblowers should have the opportunity to report compliance issues directly and anonimously to an independent federal Supervisory board.

    Whistleblowers that choose to report within a company, should always directly reporte to the compliance officer, the executive board and the supervisory board. On top of this they should always, especially in case of discharge, dismissal or demotion, have the right to escalate to the federal Supervisor.

  • Change supervisory procedures and criteria
    Approval of (company) board members by the federal Supervisor should als be based upon:
    1. The 'ethical track record' of a candidate
    2. The feasibility of, in macro economic perspective, "realistic and balanced" board member performance parameters.

      The federal Supervisor should audit and approve the existence of a consistent 'company reward plan' that guarantees a sound and measurable balance between long term company results and board member rewards.

      CEO's that haven't established measurable long term added value for their company, shouldn't receive any bonus or golden parachute at all.